Who Gains From Non-Collusive Corruption? by Foellmi, Reto & Oechslin, Manuel
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich
Working Paper Series
ISSN 1424-0459
Working Paper No. 142
Who Gains From Non-Collusive Corruption?
Reto Foellmi and Manuel Oechslin
January 2003
Who Gains from Non-Collusive
Corruption?
Reto Foellmi and Manuel Oechslin∗†
January 27, 2003
Abstract
We explore the impact of non-collusive corruption on factor rewards
and on the wealth distribution. We show that the distributional conse-
quences depend crucially on the degree of capital market imperfections.
With perfect capital markets, corruption does not redistribute wealth
within the private sector. However, if borrowing is limited, members of
the ”middle class” suﬀer most since bribery drives them out of the capital
market. This in turn makes access to credit easier for relatively wealthy
individuals such that a group of them even wins. So, the interest of the
latter in overcoming a corrupt regime may be very limited. In the empiri-
cal section, we provide cross-country evidence showing that a high level of
corruption and a polarization in the income distribution go indeed hand
in hand.
JEL classification: O11, D31, D73
Keywords: corruption, income inequality, development
∗University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bluemlisalp-
strasse 10, CH- 8006 Zu¨rich, Tel: ++41-1-634 36 09, Fax: ++41-1-634 49 07, e-mail:
rfoellmi@iew.unizh.ch, oechslin@iew.unizh.ch.
†We thank Martin Brown, Josef Zweimu¨ller and the seminar participants at the European
Science Days 2002 in Steyr for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
In its recent World Development Report on poverty the World Bank emphasizes
that corruption is one of the major obstacles in the fight against poverty in the
developing world. Indeed, recent empirical work by Li et al. (2000) has found
that corruption hampers growth and increases inequality. Mauro (1995) has
found a negative association between corruption and investment. Friedman
et al. (2000) provide evidence that greater corruption and a large unoﬃcial
economy go hand in hand.
In the light of its adverse eﬀects on economic performance and poverty re-
duction in the developing world it is astonishing that extensive corruption is so
persistent in many of the low-income countries. Why is a corrupt bureaucracy
not fought by a government exactly appointed to do so? There might be a sim-
ple reason if corruption is mutually beneficial between the oﬃcial and his client.
As Bardhan (1997) underlines, neither the oﬃcial nor the private agent has an
incentive to report or protest in that case. This means that collusive corruption
is insidious and diﬃcult to detect and therefore likely to be persistent. However,
corruption is often not mutually beneficial between the oﬃcial and the private
agent but imposes additional costs in particular on firms. Rose-Ackerman (1999,
p. 15-7) reviews anecdotal evidence showing that non-collusive corruption, i.e.
corruption that benefits only the dishonest oﬃcials,1 increases the costs of en-
gaging in economic activity dramatically.2 In Section 2 we show that this kind
of corruption is pervasive throughout the less developed world.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the forces behind persistent corrup-
tion without theft from a theoretical point of view. We explore distributional
consequences of this kind of corruption in an economy where individuals are
heterogeneous with respect to their wealth but are otherwise identical. In par-
1Corruption without theft (from the government) in the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny
(1993). Henceforth ”corruption without theft” and ”non-collusive corruption” are treated as
synonyms.
2For instance, in St. Petersburg in 1992 firms had to pay USD 200 in irregular ”additional
payments” for a telephone installation (Webster and Charap, 1993).
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ticular, we analyse the impact of bribery on individual investment opportunities
and on aggregate variables such as the equilibrium interest rate and the wealth
distribution. So far, the literature has neglected the distributional consequences
of corruption via its impact on factor rewards. However, in our view, it is central
to analyse who has to back the costs of corruption after taking into account the
general equilibrium eﬀects. If the burden of corruption is unequally distributed,
individuals or groups in society face diﬀerent incentives to fight against corrup-
tion.
Our model focuses on non-collusive corruption taking place between firms
and lower-level bureaucracy. We assume that an entrepreneur has to pay bribes
to set up a business whereas poorer individuals who engage in a ”backyard
project” or deposit their money on a savings account are not subject to bribery.
The total bribe to be paid by an entrepreneur increases absolutely in the project
size but decreases relatively to the project size. Indeed, empirical evidence
suggests that the direct burden of corruption is rather unequally distributed
and falls disproportionately on entrepreneurs belonging to the ”middle class”.
Recent studies (Clarke and Xu, 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2000; European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, 1999) have found that bribe costs as a
share of firms’ revenues are falling in the firm size.
After having paid the bribes, an entrepreneur is free to invest. We assume
that minimum investment is required to set up a business. It is obvious that,
under these conditions, unequally wealthy individuals may be aﬀected diﬀer-
ently from a dishonest bureaucracy when credit markets are imperfect and,
consequently, initial wealth serves as collateral determining how much can be
borrowed. We allow for credit market imperfections as arising from imperfect
enforcement of credit contracts.3
Our analysis provides two main results. First, the distributional conse-
quences depend crucially on imperfections in the capital market. If the capital
market is perfect, corruption does not adversely aﬀect the wealth distribution.
3The implication that one can borrow more with a higher collateral does not depend on
the exact microfoundations of the credit market imperfection (see Piketty, 1997).
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Corruption lowers the return on all investment opportunities to the same extent
and, consequently, each individual bears the same relative burden. However,
things change substantially if individual borrowing is limited due to imperfect
enforcement of credit contracts. We show that poorer individuals and especially
the ”middle class” bear a big share of the burden imposed by dishonest oﬃcials.
Thus, the distributional pattern mentioned above is enforced once we take into
account macroeconomic eﬀects. Second, we identify a group of individuals other
than the bureaucrats that even win from a higher degree of corruption because
the benefits emerging through macroeconomic channels overcompensate the di-
rect costs of paying a bribe. This group consists of the wealthy entrepreneurs.
The results are driven by the fact that corruption reduces the ex ante wealth
of potential entrepreneurs. If capital markets are imperfect, wealth serves as a
collateral determining how much can be borrowed in the capital market. Thus,
a higher level of bribery reduces the wealth that can serve as collateral and
hence limits the access to the capital market. Some members of the ”middle
class” are no longer able to finance the minimum investment required to set up
a business. Hence, capital demand decreases which in turn lowers the interest
rate. Whereas the poor and the ”middle class” lose, the lower interest rate
favours the wealthy entrepreneurs despite the fact that each member of this
group faces a direct adverse eﬀect of corruption on his investment return.
If the privileged class governs both the private and the public sector, we
may interpret corruption without theft as a particular form of rent-seeking. Li,
Squire, and Zou (1998) provide evidence that in countries with weak democratic
institutions the government is indeed ”captured” by the rich.4 Thus, focusing
on the interaction between weak democratic institutions and weak market in-
stitutions, this paper identifies another mechanism by which inequality may
promote redistribution and aﬀect eﬃciency. In this sense, our work is linked
to Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994)
who investigate the eﬀects of inequality on the demand for fiscal redistribu-
4Be´nabou (2000) argues that even in democratic societies eﬀective political power is cor-
related with wealth.
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tion, and to Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1996),
who argue that high inequality - by triggering social unrest, mass violence,
and civil wars - endangers property rights and discourages investment by the
rich. In our model, however, rent-seeking takes place in exactly the opposite
way. The rich redistribute from the poor on condition that political and eco-
nomic power are positively associated. Thus, our work is most closely related to
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2002) who argue that high inequality allows
the wealthy to subvert legal institutions for their own benefit.
At a broader level, this paper is related to a literature underlining that
existing powerful groups may block the introduction of new technologies because
they fear the loss of political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2002) or of
economic rents (e.g. Olson, 1982, or Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss shortly
diﬀerent types of corruption and provide evidence showing that non-collusive
corruption is pervasive in the less developed world. In addition, we argue that
the perception of corruption is strongly influenced by the level of non-collusive
corruption. Section 3 sets up the basic model and examines the static mar-
ket equilibrium. The distributional consequences of corruption are explored in
Section 4. We distinguish explicitly the cases of perfect and imperfect capital
markets and state our two main results. In Secton 5 we briefly discuss an exten-
sion of the static model in which both aggregate savings and the dynamics of the
wealth distribution are endogenous. We argue that corruption hampers growth
and polarizes the wealth distribution. In Section 6, we present cross-country cor-
relations between the change in inequality and the level of corruption. Section
7 concludes.
2 Types of Corruption
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguish between two types of corruption. First,
in the case without theft (from the government), the oﬃcial does not hide the
transaction with a private agent and passes the transaction’s price - if there is
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one - to the government but charges something extra for himself. This means
that the oﬃcial imposes additional costs on the private agent. A well-known
and striking example for corruption without theft is Peru in the early eighties.
As described by De Soto (1989), there were eleven requirements for setting up
a small industry. In an experiment, a potential entrepreneur was asked for
additional, irregular payments on ten occasions. On two of these occasions,
the entrepreneur was forced to pay the bribe since there was no other way to
complete the procedure and to continue. Second, in the case with theft, the
oﬃcial does not turn over anything to the government at all, and hides the
transaction. This kind of corruption is mutually beneficial as long as the bribes
demanded are smaller than the price required by the government.
Many authors, among them Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 604) and Bardhan
(1997, p. 1334), argue that we should expect collusive corruption to be more
persistent than non-collusive since in the case with theft the interests of the
oﬃcial and the private agent are aligned and neither the briber nor the bribee
has an incentive to protest. In addition, collusive corruption often benefits an
influential group in society. For instance, evidence for Gambia, Mozambique,
and Ghana suggests that corruption with theft permits the rich to avoid taxes
(Dia, 1996).
What does the data say with respect to the persistence of non-collusive cor-
ruption? There are essentially two problems in answering this question. First,
we have to rely on the perception of corruption since there is no objective data
on the extent of any kind of corruption. This gives rise to our second problem.
Leading corruption perceptions indices (e.g. the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index [TI-CPI]) do not explicitly deal with collusive or
non-collusive corruption.5 Hence, we are not able to make a sound judgement
about the persistence of non-collusive corruption from an empirical point of
5For instance, the TI-CPI 2001 is constructed from seven component surveys. The subjects
asked about in these component surveys vary considerably. They range from ”How do you rate
corruption in terms of its quality or contribution to the overall living/working environment?”
to the ”frequency of bribing” in various contexts.
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view.
However, there exists some evidence for the extent of non-collusive corrup-
tion for the time being. In its attempt to measure ”Conditions for Business Op-
eration and Growth”, the World Bank (2002) recently asked over 10,000 firms
in 80 countries questions about corruption. Beside the general question about
the impact of corruption on the ”operation and growth of the business” (”no
obstacle”, ”minor obstacle”, ”moderate obstacle”, ”major obstacle”), more de-
tailed questions were asked. Inter alia, firm managers where asked first whether
it is common for firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular
”additional payments” to get things done, and second, after having done the
”additional payment”, whether another governmental oﬃcial will subsequently
require an ”additional payment” for the same service. As a third question, firm
managers had to specify, when doing business with the government, how much
of the contract value a firm in their industry would typically oﬀer in additional
or unoﬃcial payments to secure the contract.
In pursuing corruption along the lines of the first and second question, an
oﬃcial steals from private firms and not from the government because he asks for
irregular ”additional payments” to provide a governmental service. Thus, the
responses (”always”, ”mostly”, ”frequently”, ”sometimes”, ”seldom”, ”never”)
to these questions mirror the extent of non-collusive corruption. In contrast,
the responses to the third question (”zero”, ”up to 5 %”, ”6 to 10 %”, ”11 to
15 %”, ”16 to 20 %”, ”more than 20 %”) predict something about the level of
corruption with theft. It is well known that corruption in the awarding of major
contracts inflates the costs of public projects. Therefore, it seems convenient
to subsume this type of corruption under corruption with theft. As a plausible
measure for non-collusive (collusive) corruption in a given country we propose
the share of firms responding ”never” or ”seldom” (”zero” or ”up to 5 %”).6
To construct a measure for the impact of corruption on the ”operation and
growth of the business”, World Bank attaches 1 to ”no obstacle”, 2 to ”minor
obstacle”, an so on, and then takes the average. As can be seen from Table 1,
6The range of both of these measures is [0,1], with 1 indicating least corruption.
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non-collusive corruption is pervasive in the less developed regions of the world.
In addition, countries with a high level of non-collusive corruption are also those
in which firm managers indicate that corruption is an obstacle to the operation
and growth of their business: Spearman’s rank correlation between the measure
for the impact of corruption on the ”operation and growth of the business” and
our measure for non-collusive corruption is about 0.78. The correlation between
the measure for the general impact of corruption and our measure for collusive
corruption is significantly smaller: 0.69.
Table 1
It is also worth noting that the correlation between our simple measure of
non-collusive corruption and TI-CPI 2001, which measures the perception of
”extensive corruption”, is extremely high. Spearman’s rank correlation is about
0.82 whereas the correlation between the measure for collusive corruption and
the TI-CPI 2001 is only about 0.58. In addition, running a regression with
TI-CPI 2001 as the dependent variable and our measures for both collusive
and non-collusive corruption as independent variables shows that non-collusive
corruption explains a large share of the variance in the TI-CPI 2001. A one
standard deviation increase in the measure for non-collusive corruption increases
the TI-CPI by 1.35 points whereas the same figure for collusive corruption is only
about 0.37 (see Table 2). Additional correlations are given in Table 3. These
correlations are evidence supporting the view that there is a close relationship
between the perception of corruption as, for instance, reported in the TI-CPI
and the extent of non-collusive corruption.
Table 2, Table 3
We conclude that in a huge number of countries throughout the developing
world non-collusive corruption is on a persistent high level. In addition, the
perception of corruption seems to be highly influenced by the extent of this
kind of corruption. The empirical evidence for the negative impact of perceived
corruption on investment and growth in mind (Section 1), we hypothesize that
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primarily non-collusive corruption imposes strong restrictions on economic ac-
tivity and development.
In what follows we argue that the persistence of non-collusive corruption may
be rooted in its distributional properties. We show that, beside the oﬃcials, cor-
ruption without theft also favours non-oﬃcials on condition that bribery follows
the regressive pattern reported by Clarke and Xu (2002) and that capital mar-
kets are poorly developed. Thus, corruption without theft may be interpreted
as rent-seeking leading to redistribution from the relatively poor to the rich.
However, the winners of corruption are not rewarded directly, as it is the case
with collusive corruption, but through general equilibrium channels.
3 The model
3.1 The Basic Assumptions
We consider a closed economy that is populated by a large number (a contin-
uum) of individuals. The individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their
initial wealth endowment w but otherwise identical. The utility function of
the individuals is assumed to be linear. This implies that each agent seeks to
maximize his wealth. Initial wealth is distributed according the continuous dis-
tribution function G(w), which gives the measure of the population with wealth
less than w. The population size is normalized to one.
An agent has two diﬀerent physical investment opportunities. First, he may
invest his wealth endowment into a ”backyard project”. This yields a return
(output per unit of capital invested) of r ≥ 1. Second, he may become an
entrepreneur and may invest k units consisting of his own wealth and, possibly,
borrowed funds into an ”investment project” which yields a return of R > r ≥ 1.
Beside these physical investment opportunities, an agent may become a lender
on an economy-wide capital market. The endogenously determined interest rate
is ρ. Note that, in equilibrium, ρ must be at least as high as r because of the
existence of the ”backyard project”.
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To succeed, an entrepreneur has to invest an amount that is higher than
some specific threshold level. In addition, he has to undertake bureaucratic
procedures that can only be completed by paying bribes to lower-level oﬃcials.
In particular, we take the following two assumptions: First, there is a minimum
requirement of one unit of capital to start an ”investment project”. With a
lower level of input, the project will not generate any returns. Second, the
entrepreneur has to pay corruption fees. These corruption fees serve only to
get a de iure costless business licence. They do not favour a particular investor
compared to another investor who pays the fees as well. That is, we focus on
corruption without theft in the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1993). To
summarize, after having paid the bribes to the oﬃcials, the entrepreneur is free
to invest. If he invests an amount of k ≥ 1 into the ”investment project”, the
gross output is Rk. If he invests less than one unit, the project output is zero.
Neither a minimum investment nor a ”business licence” is required in the case
of the low yield ”backyard project”.7
The total bribe to be paid depends on the project size k and is given by
βb(k), with b0 ≥ 0, b00 ≤ 0, and R ≥ r(1 + lim
k→∞
βb0(k)). The assumptions con-
cerning the derivatives of βb(k) imply that the bribe costs relative to the project
size are nonincreasing in the project size. This assumption is consistent with
the empirical findings mentioned above. The last inequality makes sure that
entrepreneurship is attractive. Intuitively, this condition states that an increase
in the ”investment project” size by one unit (which requires 1 + βb0(k) addi-
tional units of capital) yields a higher return than the same investment into a
”backyard project” - at least for large project sizes. The multiplicative param-
eter β > 0 reflects the level of corruption given the specific pattern of bribery.
To close the model, we assume that all bribe collecting oﬃcials are lenders and
do not act as entrepreneurs.
If an agent with initial wealth w < k desires to invest k units of capital,
he has to borrow on the economy-wide capital market. The capital market is
7Thus, our ”backyard project” (”investment project”) corresponds - in some sense - to the
”subsistence” (”cash-crop”) production in Murphy et al. (1993).
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competitive in the sense that the individuals take the equilibrium interest rate
ρ as given. However, there is a capital market imperfection due to imperfect
enforcement of credit contracts.8 An entrepreneur may refuse to honour his
payment obligation. We assume that an entrepreneur can seize a fraction 1− λ
of the project output if he avoids the payment obligation. The parameter λ ≤ 1
can be interpreted as a measure for the capital market eﬃciency. In our simple
model, capital market eﬃciency depends directly on the eﬀectiveness of the
legal system. For example, a λ of zero means that default is never followed by a
sanction whereas in the case λ = 1 the enforcement of credit contracts is perfect
and the capital market is as well. Taking into account the entrepreneurial
incentives, the lenders will give additional credit to an entrepreneur (that is
to an individual who invests into the ”investment project”) as long as it is in
the enterpreneur’s own interest to repay the debt. This will be the case if the
payment obligation ρc, where c is the total amount of credit, does not exceed
the cost of default λRk for the enterpreneur. Hence, an entrepreneur investing
k units of capital gets a maximum credit cmax of λRρ k capital units. Note that
in equilibrium default will not occur. The capital market is imperfect because
it is possible to default.
3.2 The Static Equilibrium
The existence of the capital market imperfection implies that the maximum
project size depends positively on the wealth endowment w. Suppose that an
entrepreneur wants to invest k units of capital into an ”investment project”.
Since the entrepreneur has to pay the bribes first, the own capital w(k) required
is determined by
w(k) = k + βb(k)− cmax.
Taking cmax = λRρ k into account, we get
w(k) = βb(k) +
µ
1− λR
ρ
¶
k. (1)
8In modelling the capital market imperfection we follow Matsuyama (2000).
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It is clear that w0(k) = βb0(k) + 1 − λRρ , k ∈ [1,∞), must be greater than
zero in equilibrium. Suppose the opposite were true. In this case, w(k) is
equal to zero (if w0 = 0) or becomes negative if k grows large (if w0 < 0).
This means that every individual has unlimited access to the capital market.
Given the assumption w0(k) ≤ 0, ρ must be smaller than λR < R. This means
that everyone seeks to invest an infinite sum and, as a consequence, capital
demand exceeds capital supply. This cannot be an equilibrium. We conclude
that w0(k) > 0, and that own capital plays the role of collateral in our model.
Equation (1) allows us to determine the minimum wealth level w(1) ≡ w˜1
that enables an individual to invest exactly one unit of capital:
w˜1 = βb(1) + 1−
λR
ρ
> 0 (2)
All individuals with initial wealth w > w˜1 are able to become an entrepreneur.
The intuition of (2) is easy to grasp. The amount that an enterpreneur can
borrow is given by cmax = λRρ k. A higher interest rate ρ, a lower capital market
eﬃciency λ, and a lower project return R reduce cmax. Thus, the cutoﬀ-level to
become an entrepreneur must rise in ρ and fall in λ and in R. A higher total
bribe βb(1) translates one-to-one in an increase of w˜1 since the bribes must be
paid before the project starts.
It remains to determine, however, whether an individual with wealth w˜1
wants to become an entrepreneur at all. An individual with w ≥ w˜1 chooses the
”occupation” entrepreneur if both of the two alternative opportunities, that are
(i) investing into a ”backyard project” or (ii) acting as a lender, are less attrac-
tive in terms of the investment return or, equivalently, in terms of the resulting
ex post wealth. The resulting ex post wealth of not choosing entrepreneurship
is given by wmax{ρ, r} = wρ since ρ ≥ r in an equilibrium. An entrepreneur
who borrows the maximum amount of credit earns the gross return Rk and has
to repay ρcmax = ρλRρ k. From (1) we know that k(w, ρ,β) is implicitely deter-
mined by k =
³
1− λRρ
´−1
{w − βb(k)}. Note that k is strictly increasing and
convex in w and strictly decreasing in ρ (see Appendix). The ex post wealth
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WE(w, ρ,β) of an entrepreneur is then given by
WE(w, ρ,β) = (1− λ)Rk(w, ρ,β) (3)
=
(1− λ)R
1− λRρ
{w − βb(k)}
and is also strictly increasing and convex in w. Now, we are ready to determine
the critical wealth level w˜2 where an individual is exactly indiﬀerent between an
”investment project” and one of the two alternatives. If we solveWE(w˜2, ρ,β) =
ρw˜2, we get
w˜2 =
(1− λ)R
R− ρ βb(k(w˜2, ρ)). (4)
Intuitively, a higher ρ, an uppward shift of the bribe function, or a lower R
make entrepreneurship less favourable. As a consequnece, w˜2 must rise. If λ,
our measure for capital market eﬃciency, rises an entrepreneur can borrow more
capital and therefore manage larger project sizes. This makes entrepreneurship
more attractive as long as R > ρ. Thus, w˜2 falls in λ.
The following lemma shows that ∂WE(w, ρ,β)/∂w ≥ ρ if w exceeds max{w˜1, w˜2}.
This implies that (for individuals with initial wealth w ≥ max{w˜1, w˜2}) it is in-
deed optimal to invest the whole initial wealth endowment plus the maximum
amount of credit into an ”investment project”. The other agents will become
lenders (if ρ > r ) or are indiﬀerent between investing into a ”backyard project”
or becoming lenders (if ρ = r).
Lemma 1 Additional wealth is more valuable for an entrepreneur than for a
lender: ∂WE(w, ρ,β)/∂w ≥ ρ with strict inequality if b00 < 0.
Proof. We show first that WE(w, ρ,β) is strictly increasing and convex
in w. Note that ∂WE(w)/∂w = (1−λ)R
1−λRρ +βb0(k(w))
> 0 since the denominator is
positive for k ∈ [1,∞) and λ < 1. Since b00 ≤ 0, the ex post wealth WE of an
entrepreneur is convex in w and strictly convex in w, if b00 < 0.
Let us consider first the case where w˜1 ≥ w˜2. In that case WE(w˜1) ≥
ρw˜1 holds. Using (2) and (3) this condition can be rewritten: (1 − λ)R ≥
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Figure 1: The resulting wealth inequality
ρ
³
βb(1) + 1− λRρ
´
. With this result we get: ∂W
E(w)
∂w
¯¯¯
w>w˜1
≥ ∂W
E(w)
∂w
¯¯¯
w=w˜1
=
(1−λ)R
1−λRρ +βb0(1)
≥ ρ(βb(1)+1−
λR
ρ )
1−λRρ +βb0(1)
≥ ρ since b(1) ≥ b0(1).
Now, let us consider the case w˜2 > w˜1. SinceW
E(w) is convex, it must cross
the ρw−line from below at w = w˜2. Thus, the claim of the lemma immediately
follows.
Figure 1 below shows the relationship between the endowment w and the
resulting ex post wealth of an individual. If w˜1 > w˜2, the borrowing constraint
determines who is to become an entrepreneur. Figure 1a shows that the ex
post wealth rises discontinuously at w˜1. In the case of w˜2 ≥ w˜1 (Figure 1b), an
agent with wealth w˜2 is indiﬀerent between the two ”occupations” entrepreneur
and lender. From Lemma 1 we know that an additional unit of initial wealth
increases the ex post wealth of an entrepreneur to a larger extent than the ex
post wealth of a lender: ∂WE(w)/∂w > ρ. The reason is that a higher wealth
weakens the borrowing constraint and allows larger projects seizes k financed
by ”cheap” capital. Thus, under imperfect capital markets, each individual
wants to invest an infinite sum into the entrepreneurial project. However, this
is not possible due to the enforcement problems. To which extent an individual
can take advantage of the favourable borrowing conditions depends on its own
14
wealth.
We complete our description of the static equilibrium by deriving the (gross)
capital demand function and the (gross) capital supply function. Gross capital
demand
¡
KD
¢
is simply the sum of all entrepreneurial project sizes. Since the
project size k(w, ρ,β) of an entrepreneur with initial wealth w is implicitely
determined by k =
³
1− λRρ
´−1
{w − βb(k)} , the gross capital demand relation
of the economy can be written as
KD(ρ) =
1
1− λRρ
Z ∞
max{w˜1,w˜2}
{w − βb(k(w, ρ))} g(w)dw (5)
If λ < 1, KD is uniformly falling in the interest rate ρ because the maximum
project size k decreases in the interest rate. Gross capital supply KS is equal
to the aggregate wealth endowment
R∞
0
wg(w)dw =: K¯ as long as ρ > r. In the
case of ρ > r, nobody will choose to invest into a ”backyard project” and the
economy-wide stock of capital is allocated to high yield ”investment projects”.
In the case of ρ = r, a lender is indiﬀerent between investing into a ”backyard
project” or putting the money on a savings account. Finally, if ρ < r, capital
supply will, of course, be zero. Hence, the gross capital supply curve KS is a
horizontal line at ρ = r and is vertical for ρ > r at the capital level K¯ (see
Figure 2).9 The intersection of the capital demand and capital supply curve in
Figure 2 determines the unique equilibrium interest rate ρ∗ of the economy.
It is also important to mention that capital market imperfections redistribute
wealth from the lenders to the entrepreneurs even without the presence of cor-
ruption (β = 0). However, w˜1 and k are determined solely by the minimum
investment requirement and the capital supply. They do not depend on λ since
a variation in λ leads to the same relative variation in ρ in the new equilibrium.
This means, for example, that a fall in λ neither aﬀect the number of the en-
trepreneurs nor the size of their projects. Redistribution takes place but only
through the channel of lower capital costs for fixed project sizes.
9Remember that the bribes do not aﬀect gross capital supply (and demand), because the
oﬃcials are lenders.
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4 The eﬀects of higher bribery
We now turn to the question of our primary interest. What are the distributional
consequences of corruption? The aim is to identify winners and losers from an
increase in the level of corruption, i.e. an increase in β. In what follows, b(k) is
taken as given. We explicitly distinguish the eﬀects of corruption in economies
with perfect and imperfect capital markets.
4.1 Perfect Capital Markets (λ = 1)
Under perfect capital markets we have to distinguish two cases. First, assume
that b(k) is regressive. In that case a single investment fund will collect the whole
credit supply in order to minimize the bribes paid per capital unit. The fund
invests the whole capital in the economy. Note that such a pooling institution
cannot exist as long as λ < 1 because a single individual or a institution can
borrow only up to a finite sum due to the enforcement problems. Since b(k)
is defined over individual project sizes (with mass zero) the fund has to pay
an amount of lim
k→∞
βb(k) in bribes. Its net profit per capital unit is given by
lim
k→∞
Rk−(k+βb(k))ρ
k . Applying de l’Hoˆpital’s rule we get R − (1 + limk→∞βb
0(k))ρ.
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The equilibrium interest rate is readily determined. With ρ∗ > R1+ lim
k→∞
βb0(k) ,
the investment funds would incur infinite losses. With ρ∗ < R1+ lim
k→∞
βb0(k) , new
pooling institutions would enter and oﬀer a slightly higher interest rate to the
lenders. We conclude that competition drives the interest rate up to the point
where net profit per capital unit of the investment fund is zero, i.e. up to ρ∗ =
R
1+ lim
k→∞
βb0(k) . Thus, the lenders and the single entrepreneur running the fund earn
the same rate of return on their wealth. Note that R = ρ∗ if lim
k→∞
b0(k) = 0. In
this case, the pooling institution has to pay a bribe but this bribe is only of mass
zero. Thus, pooling profits (which are of discrete nature) remain unaﬀected. In
addition, this implies that the oﬃcials can only appropriate a zero mass of
output.
Second, assume that b0(k) is constant and equals b. In that case, there may
exist a large number of firms each investing at least an amount of 1. Firm size
and number are indetermined as it is usually the case in perfect competition
and constant returns to scale environments. As it is the case above, net profit
of each firm equals zero due to perfect competition. Lenders and entrepreneurs
face the same rate of return ρ∗ = R
1+βb on their wealth.
We see that the eﬀects of bribery in the first and the second case are very sim-
ilar. Corruption does not redistribute wealth within the group of non-oﬃcials.
Each individual bears the same relative burden of corruption. The only diﬀer-
ence lies in the firm number and in the potential for oﬃcials to generate bribes.
In the linear case, corruption always redistributes wealth from the non-oﬃcials
to the oﬃcials whereas in the regressive case redistribution between these two
groups takes only place if lim
k→∞
b0(k) > 0. To summarize, our main finding are
stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 In the case of perfect capital markets (λ = 1), the equilibrium
interest rate ρ∗ equals R1+ lim
k→∞
βb0(k) . Lenders and entrepreneurs face the same
rate of return on their wealth. Corruption does not redistribute wealth within
the group of non-oﬃcials.
Note that an increase in β does not aﬀect eﬃciency as long as corruption is
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Figure 3: Impact of higher bribery on the interest rate
not at a ”very high” level, i.e. as long as R1+ lim
k→∞
βb0(k) ≥ r which means that the
economy-wide capital stock is invested into high yield ”investment projects”.
4.2 Imperfect Capital Markets (λ < 1)
So far, we discussed briefly the distributional consequences of capital market
imperfections (Section 3) and of corruption in an economy with perfect capital
markets (Subsection 4.1). In this section, we explore the distributional conse-
quences of corruption in an economy with imperfect capital markets. We show
that in the case ρ∗ > r more corruption alters the number of entrepreneurs
and, through its impact on the interest rate, redistributes also wealth within
the group of non-oﬃcials. In contrast, if ρ∗ = r an increase in the level of
corruption does no longer redistribute wealth within the private sector.
ρ∗> r. It is easy to see that the direct impact of corruption on the en-
trepreneurial wealth is adverse. But, as mentioned above, there is a second,
macroeconomic channel operating through the interest rate. Figure 3a shows
the eﬀect of a higher β on the interest rate.
Proposition 2 If λ < 1 and ρ∗ > r, the equilibrium interest rate falls in the
level of corruption β.
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Proof. Formally, the eﬀect of bribery on the interest rate ρ can be deter-
mined by computing dρdβ from equation (5), taking into account that K
D = K¯ =
const. However, it is more convenient to prove the claim by contradiction.
Assume that dρdβ ≥ 0. In this case, both w˜1 and w˜2 are increasing in β since
more capital is needed to become an entrepreneur and the interest rate alters in
favour of the lenders (dw˜1dβ and
dw˜2
dβ are given in the Appendix). This means that
the number of entrepreneurs falls in β for sure. In addition, the project sizes of
the remaining entrepreneurs decrease as well. But this cannot be an equilibrium
because aggregate capital allocated to ”investment projects” is constant as long
as ρ∗ > r. We conclude that dρdβ < 0.
The channel operating through the interest rate aﬀects both the wealth of
the lenders and the wealth of the entrepreneurs. It is clear that the lower
interest rate hurts all lenders, i.e. all individuals with initial wealth below
max{w˜1, w˜2} in the new equilibrium. This means that a general equilibrium
eﬀect shifts bribe costs partially to the lenders. At the same time, capital
costs for the remaining entrepreneus are going down. In contrast to the perfect
capital market case, the macroeconomic eﬀect works in favour of the remaining
entrepreneurs. Consequently, only the impact of bribery on the ex post wealth
of both the ”new” and the ”old” lenders is unambiguous. Figure 3a shows the
eﬀect of a higher β on the interest.
In the following exposition we explore the conditions under which an en-
trepreneur benefits from a higher level of corruption, i.e. the conditions under
which the general equilibrium eﬀect overcompensates the direct negative eﬀect
of higher bribery. We proceed in two steps. First, we show how the number
of entrepreneurs depends on β. This is done in Lemma 2 below. Then, we are
ready to state and prove our main results (Proposition 3).
Lemma 2 A higher level of corruption β increases the critical wealth level to
become an entrepreneur w˜1. In addition, w˜2 increases in β if the bribe function
is ”enough” regressive.
Proof. We first prove that dw˜1dβ > 0. The proof is by contradiction. Assume
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that dw˜1dβ = b(1) + λR/ρ
2 dρ
dβ ≤ 0. This assumption immediately implies that
dk
dβ
¯¯¯
w=w˜1
≥ 0. It remains to determine the sign of dkdβ for wealth levels greater
than w˜1. To do this, we put dk/dβ sligthly diﬀerent:
dk
dβ
= −
³
1 + λRρ2
k
b(k)
dρ
dβ
´
b(k)
1− λRρ + βb0(k)
A higher w increases k and, since b0(k) ≥ 0, b00(k) ≤ 0, the absolute value of
the nominator of the above expression. At the same time, the denominator
decreases or remains constant. This means that dkdβ
¯¯¯
w>w˜1
> dkdβ
¯¯¯
w=w˜1
≥ 0. In
addition, if w˜1 < w˜2, our argument implies that
dk
dβ
¯¯¯
w=w˜2
> 0. So, it must be
that the ex post wealth at the initial w˜2 is now strictly higher. Therefore, w˜2
must decrease in β as well. Thus, if dw˜1dβ ≤ 0, not only the project sizes are
greater in the new equilibrium but also the number of entrepreneurs increases,
no matter whether w˜1 is smaller or greater than w˜2. Since capital supply is
fixed, this cannot be an equilibrium. We conclude that dw˜1dβ > 0.
We now turn to the sign of dw˜2dβ . Since the denominator of the expression
for dw˜2dβ is always positive at w = w˜2 (see Appendix), w˜2 increases in β if
βb(k)/k
(1+βb0(k)) >
¯¯¯
dρ
dβ
¯¯¯
β
ρ .
Note that the inequality at the end of the above proof is likely to be fulfilled
if (i) the marginal bribe at k(w˜old2 , ·) is relatively small compared to the average
bribe and (ii) the interest rate does not decrease to a large extent in β. The
intuition is as follows. Since k(w˜old2 , ·) falls for sure in the new equilibrium,
the marginal bribe determines how much the total bribe decreases due to this
reduction in the project size. On the other hand, the higher the average bribe
costs are, the stronger is the absolute increase in the bribe costs due to a higher
β. So, in case of an increase in β, the combination of a high average bribe
and a small marginal bribe reduces the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial
project strongly. This reduction must be compared to the reduction in the
interest rate, i.e. to the reduction in the return of the alternative investment
opportunity. If ρ does not fall to a great extent, the individual with initial
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wealth w˜old2 switches from the ”occupation” entrepreneur to the ”occupation”
lender and w˜new2 > w˜
old
2 . In addition, note that w˜2 may only decrease locally in
β. Since w˜1 rises as β increases, the threshold level w˜2 cannot steadily decrease
because otherwise the condition w˜1 < w˜2 will be violated eventually.
Proposition 3 (i). If w˜1 ≥ w˜2 or w˜1 < w˜2 and dw˜2dβ ≥ 0, there exists a group
of entrepreneurs with wealth level w > wˆ such that dW
E
dβ
¯¯¯
w>wˆ
> 0.
(ii). In the case of w˜1 < w˜2 and
dw˜2
dβ < 0, there exists a wealth level w such
that dW
E
dβ
¯¯¯
w>w
> 0 if lim
k→∞
b0(k) is bounded from above.
Proof. (i). In that case, both w˜1 and w˜2 are increasing in β. This means
that a rise in the level of corruption leads to a smaller class of entrepreneurs.
Because total investment is fixed and dkdβ is positively associated with w, a non-
zero mass of rich agents with w > wˆ will invest more. But this implies that
their ex post wealth increases because WE(w) = (1− λ)Rk (see equation (3)).
(ii). The expression for dkdβ can be rewritten as
∂k
∂w
λR
ρ2 k
h¯¯¯
dρ
dβ
¯¯¯
− b(k)k
ρ2
λR
i
. Ap-
plying de l’Hoˆpital’s rule we get lim
k→∞
dk
dβ =
·¯¯¯
dρ
dβ
¯¯¯
− lim
k→∞
b0(k) ρ
2
λR
¸
lim
k→∞
∂k
∂w
λR
ρ2 k. Since
the sign of the second factor is unambiguous, it remains to determine the sign
of the first one. Note that dw˜2dβ < 0 implies that
¯¯¯
dρ
dβ
¯¯¯
> ρb(k)k(1+βb0(k)) . There-
fore, lim
k→∞
dk
dβ is positive if limk→∞
b0(k) < λRρ
b(k(w˜2))
k(w˜2)(1+βb0(k(w˜2))) . To get a more
intuitive expression note that λRρ
b(k)
k((1+βb0(k)) > λ
b(k)
k > λb
0(k). The former
inequality stems form the fact that R − ρ(1 + βb0(k)) > 0 (see Appendix).
Therefore we can state the following suﬃcient condition: lim
k→∞
dk
dβ is positive if
lim
k→∞
b0(k) ≤ λb0(k(w˜2)).
It is worth noting that our analysis applies for a marginal increase in the
corruption level form every starting level β ≥ 0. If we restrict our attention to
the case in which corruption rises marginally from zero to some positive level,
w˜2 < w˜1 always holds. This means that the introduction of regressive bribery
in lower-level bureaucracy reduces the number of entrepreneurs and favours a
non-zero mass of wealthy entrepreneurs for sure. But even in the case where w˜2
is binding and locally decreasing in β, there exists a wealth level w such that all
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Figure 4: Impact of higher bribery on the wealth distribution
individuals with w > w are favoured by the increase in beta if the bribe function
is ”enough” regressive.
So far, we analysed the impact of corruption on the ex post wealth of the poor
and the rich individuals. But how are the individuals between these two groups
(the ”middle class”) aﬀected? This can be shown most evidently in Figure 4
where we assume that w˜1 > w˜2 (Figure 4a) or w˜2 > w˜1 and
dw˜2
dβ > 0 (Figure
4b). An increase in β hurts (indirectly and only moderately) all individuals
that have already been lenders before the rise in β. The wealthy entrepreneurs
with wealth levels above wˆ1 (wˆ2) in Figure 4a (figure 4b) are favoured. In
contrast, the group consisting of individuals with initial wealth between w˜1,0
and w˜1,1 (w˜2,0 and w˜2,1) in Figure 4a (Figure 4b) loses substantially. These
individuals have been entrepreneurs before but act as lenders now. In Figure
4a (w˜1 > w˜2) the borrowing constraint becomes binding for members of the
”middle class” whereas in Figure 4b (w˜2 ≥ w˜1) it does no longer pay to become
an entrepreneur. In addition, the remaining entrepreneurs incur substantial
losses if their wealth is only slightly above w˜1 or w˜2, respectively.
ρ∗= r. The equilibrium interest rate equals its lower bound r if corruption
is at a very high level. As β grows, the capital demand is shifting to the left
and eventually crosses the capital supply curve in its flat region (figure 3b).
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There are two main diﬀerences compared to the case discussed above. First, the
distributional consequences of higher corruption change. If β rises, the interest
rate is unaﬀected, hence the lenders do not suﬀer from higher corruption. The
costs are fully borne by the enterpreneurs’ class. The members of this class have
to pay higher total bribes but the interest rate does no longer change in their
favour. This means that their access to the capital market has worsened and
that the project sizes are generally reduced. Thus, each remaining entrepreneur
experiences a loss irrespective of his wealth. Since the poor lenders gain in
relative terms, overall inequality tends to fall. So, our model predicts that there
is a hump-shaped relationship between the level of corruption and inequality.
Second, the capital invested in the modern sector decreases since w˜1 and
w˜2 increase in β, i.e. the number of entrepreneurs is smaller than before, and
the project size is in general reduced. Thus, bribery negatively aﬀects output.
In the case discussed above, the total amount of capital allocated in the high
return projects is constant because capital supply is inelastic for ρ∗ > r (see
figure 3a). With ρ∗ = r, higher corruption crowds out investments from the
high yield ”investment sector” to the low yield ”backyard sector” (see Figure
3b).
The discussion so far was close to our basic model that includes two polar
cases with respect to capital supply. Either gross capital supply is vertical
or horizontal. However, we may also shortly and only informally consider a
situation where capital supply is positively sloped due to, for instance, imperfect
international capital mobility. The distributional consequences in this case lie in
between the two polar cases. For a given increase in the level of corruption, the
interest rate falls ceteris paribus less when capital supply is elastic. In addition,
aggregate investment into the high return investment project falls but only to
a relatively small extent compared to the case with perfectly elastic supply.
Exactly this impact of elastic supply not only makes it less likely that rich
individuals win from more corruption but also protects the poor form backing
a large part of the additional bribe costs.
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5 Endogenous Savings
In this Section we extend our model to analyse the impact of corruption on
both the dynamics of the output and the wealth distribution. For ease of expo-
sition, we consider a two-period model. In their first period of life, individuals
(exogenously) inherit a wealth endowment and have simultaneously to take two
decisions. First, individuals have to choose between becoming an entrepreneur
(E ) or staying a lender (L). Second, they have to decide on how much to save
out of their ex post wealth. The savings of the first period will be the initial
wealth in the following period. In this second period, the agents are again forced
to choose their ”occupation”. However, there is no longer savings-decision. The
entire ex post wealth is consumed. Note that, in the aggregate, higher savings
translate directly into a higher growth rate since the technology was assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to capital.
We assume that all individuals have the same logarithmic utility function
U = ln ct + θ ln ct+1,
where ct stands for consumption at date t. The parameter θ < 1 denotes the
discount factor. Since the individuals may change their ”occupation” in the
second period, there are four diﬀerent ”career paths”. To determine which path
an individual selects, we have to state the intertemporal budget constraint for
each possible case. For simplicity, we assume that the total bribe is a fixed
amount, i. e. that the bribes do not vary with project size. Denote by bt and
bt+1 the total bribe in period t and t+1, respectively.
10 For ease of notation, the
interest rate for entrepreneurs in t is defined by ρEt ≡ ∂WEt (w)/∂w =
(1−λ)R
1−λRρt
.
Note that this rate of return does not vary across entrepreneurs (as it was the
case above) since the marginal bribe is zero. The budget constraints associated
with the four diﬀerent ”career paths” are given in equation (6). An individual
who has, for instance, chosen to become an entrepreneur (E ) in the first period
10So, bribes not only must be paid to set-up a business but also to operate a business (the
business licence must be renewed every year).
24
and to become a lender (L) in the second period faces the budget constraint
denoted by (EL).
ct +
ct+1
ρEt+1
= ρEt (wt − bt)− bt+1 (EE)
ct +
ct+1
ρt+1
= ρEt (wt − bt) (EL)
ct +
ct+1
ρEt+1
= ρtwt − bt+1 (LE)
ct +
ct+1
ρt+1
= ρtwt (LL)
(6)
Figure 5 below depicts the consumption decision problem of an (first-period)
entrepreneur at the end of period one. In Figure 5a (Figure 5b), the minimum
investment restriction (incentive restriction) is binding. We focus on Figure 5a
first. The amount to be divided between consumption today and savings is
given by ρEt (wt − bt). If an entrepreneur saves at least w˜t+11 he will be able
to become an entrepreneur also in the second period of live. The fact that
ρEt+1 > ρt+1 introduces a non-convexity into the problem, and - because of
w˜t+11 > w˜
t+1
2 - the budget constraint exhibits a jump at the point where savings
exactly equal w˜t+11 . An individual will decide in favour of E if ρEt (wt − bt) is
large enough such that the marginal utility out of consumption today is not
”much larger” than marginal utility out of consumption tomorrow. In Figure
5a, the decision problem for an individual exactly indiﬀerent between E and
L in the second period (w = w∗t ) is shown. The indiﬀerence curve crosses
the budget constraint in the point where savings = w˜t+11 , and is tangent to
the budget constraint in another point where savings < w˜t+11 . Note that the
income expansion path (IEP) follows a very unusual pattern because of the non-
convexity of the budget set. In particular, there exists a wealth range in which
the IEP is horizontal. If wt equals w
∗
t or is slightly above w
∗
t , every additional
unit of ex post wealth (due to an increase in wt) is spent on consumption today
because, in a corner solution, marginal utility of consumption today is higher
than optimal consumption smoothing would imply: u0(ct) > θρEt+1u0(ct+1). In
Figure 5b, where the incentive restriction is binding, a corner solution may not
occur because the budget constraint does not jump. Consequently, the income
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Figure 5: Optimal intertemporal choice
expansion path has always a positive slope.
The whole discussion implies that the wealthier individuals are more likely
to become an entrepreneur in the second period. In particular, we can conclude
that, if there are first-period entrepreneurs who choose L in the second period,
all first-period lenders will also stay lender in the second period. Our discussion
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 W ∗ is defined as the ex post wealth level that makes an indi-
vidual indiﬀerent between E and L in the second period. Only individuals with
initial wealth W i(wt) ≥ W ∗, where i ∈ {L,E} , choose to become entrepreneurs
in the second period. If there are first-period entrepreneurs choosing L in the
second period, all first-period lenders choose again L in their second period of
life.
From Proposition 4 we conclude that the equilibrium ”occupation struc-
ture” may take three forms. First, there may be a full segregation equilibrium,
i.e. only (EE ) and (LL) arise. This means that the number of entrepreneurs
(lenders) does not change from the first to the second period since nobody
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changes the ”occupation”. This equilibrium can only occur if w˜t1 > w˜
t
2,
11 and is
more likely if ρEt is high compared to ρt. Second, there may be an equilibrium
in which a positive mass of agents switches form L to E in the second period.
Hence, there are more entrepreneurs in the second period than in the first one.
In the third possible equilibrium, some agents choose (EL) such that there are
less entrepreneurs in the second period. For each of the possible equilibria, the
impact of corruption on aggregate savings is now discussed.
Full segregation. We start with the case in which only the ”career-paths”
(LL) and (EE) may emerge in equilibrium. As mentioned above, this is only
possible if corruption is on a relatively low level and, consequently, the mini-
mum investment restriction is binding. Let’s also assume for a short time that
every entrepreneur is in an interior optimum, i.e. that nobody consumes on
the horizontal part of the income expansion path. This regime serves us as a
baseline case. If all entrepreneurs are in an interior optimum, their consumption
growth is given by the Euler equation ct+1ct = ρ
E
t+1θ. For lenders and oﬃcials,
consumption growth is given by ct+1ct = ρt+1θ. Inserting the Euler equations into
the budget constraints (6) allows us to solve for the first-period consumption:
ct =
1
1+θ
¡
ρEt (wt − bt)− bt+1
¢
(EE)
ct =
1
1+θρtwt (LL)
ct =
1
1+θ (ρtbt + bt+1) (Officials)
(7)
Note that the interest rate in the second period does not enter since income
and substitution eﬀects cancel out each other due to logarithmic instantaneous
utility. Aggregate output, which is equal to the sum of the income going to the
entrepreneurs, to the oﬃcials, and to the lenders, is given by
Yt = RK¯ =
∞Z
w˜t
ρEt (wt − bt) g(w)dw + ρtbt
∞Z
w˜t
g(w)dw +
w˜tZ
0
ρtwtg(w)dw,
11If w˜t1 < w˜
t
2, the separation equilibrium occurs also if ρw˜t2 happens to equal
max{w˜t+11 , w˜t+12 }. However, we abstract from this very unlikely case.
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where w˜t ≡ max{w˜t1, w˜t2}. Thus, aggregate consumption is given by
Ct =
1
1 + θ
Yt =
1
1 + θ
RK¯. (8)
In a two-period setting, aggregate consumption does not depend on the level
of corruption. Higher bribery (at date t or t+ 1) increases consumption of the
oﬃcials but decreases at the same time consumption of the entrepreneurs. Since
consumers have logarithmic instantaneous utility, the change in interest rates
per se does not aﬀect present savings and present consumption since income
and substitution eﬀects cancel each other. However, higher corruption implies a
negative (positive) wealth eﬀect for the entrepreneurs (the oﬃcials). On the one
hand, the entrepreneurs will reduce their consumption because they have to pay
higher bribes. On the other hand, the oﬃcials will increase consumption. In a
two period setting, the two eﬀects exactly cancel out each other. If individuals
live for more than two periods, for instance three periods, the wealth eﬀect of
more corruption will be smaller for entrepreneurs than for oﬃcials in absolute
terms. To see this formally, compare the intertemporal budget constraint for
the entrepreneurs and the oﬃcials, respectively.
ct +
ct+1
ρEt+1
+ ct+2ρEt+2ρEt+1
= ρEt (wt − bt)− bt+1 −
bt+2
ρEt+1
(Entrepreneurs)
ct +
ct+1
ρt+1
+ ct+2ρt+2ρt+1
= ρtbt + bt+1 +
bt+2
ρt+1
(Officials)
Since the interest rate is higher for entrepreneurs than for oﬃcials, the change
in the discounted value of future bribes is lower for entrepreneurs than for the
oﬃcials: bt+1+
bt+2
ρEt+1
< bt+1+
bt+2
ρt+1
. Hence, the oﬃcials increase their consumption
stronger than the enrepreneurs their savings.
We now relax the assumption that all entrepreneurs are in their interior
optimum and allow for individuals finding themselves on the flat part of the
income expansion path (IEP) in Figure 5a above. These entrepreneurs save
exactly the amount w˜t+11 that is needed to maintain the ”occupation” in period
t+1.12 As long as they do not choose L in the second period, these entrepreneurs
12Their first period consumption is given by ct = ρEt (wt − bt) −
³
1− λRρt+1
´
− bt+1 (if
entrepreneur in first period) or ct = ρtwt −
³
1− λRρt+1
´
− bt+1 (if lender in first period),
respectively. The minimum project size is one in both periods.
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strongly reduce consumption in order to keep the savings constant at w˜t+11 if
bt+1 increases. Hence, they decrease consumption much more than the oﬃ-
cials increase their consumption. Thus, this ”threshold eﬀect” induces more
corruption to increase savings.
Changes in class sizes. We now turn to the regime where, in equilibrium,
some agents do not choose the same ”occupation” in the second period. In this
case, there exist individuals who are indiﬀerent between the ”occupations” E
and L in the second period. In contrast to the discussion above, a change in
the level of corruption tomorrow will induce agents to switch from L to E (less
corruption) or vice versa (more corruption).
Assume that a higher bt+1 unambigously increases w˜
t+1
2 . In this case, more
corruption decreases the number of entrepreneurs in the second period for sure.
This has an important impact on aggregate savings. Consider the agents who
would have chosen E before but now, under a higher level of corruption, prefer
being lender in the second period. This class of individuals decreases savings
and increases first period consumption although bribes are no longer paid. This
eﬀect unambigously decreases aggregate savings. So, the ”crowding-out eﬀect”
points exactly in the opposite direction than the ”threshold eﬀect”.
We see that, from a theoretical point of view, it is a priori not clear whether
corruption reduces growth if capital markets are imperfect and the technology is
characterized by non-convexities. If there is little corruption and, consequently,
the minimum investment restriction is binding, an increase in the level of bribery
generates two competing eﬀects. On the one hand, more corruption reduces
savings because individuals, who would have saved a lot to become entrepreneurs
before, are crowded out. In a multi-period setting, savings are reduced even
more because the remaining entrepreneurs discount the future bribes stronger
than the oﬃcials. On the other hand, a ”middle-class entrepreneur” who saves
exactly w˜t+11 to become an entrepreneur in the second period (and still does so
even after the increase in bt+1) will reduce his first period consumption strongly
as bribery increases. This ”threshold eﬀect” tends to increase aggregate savings.
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However, if there is much corruption in a country, i.e. if the incentive restriction
is binding, the ”threshold eﬀect” cannot occur and the positive influence of
corruption on growth vanishes. This means that corruption unambiguously
hampers growth if it is above some level.
Proposition 5 More corruption decreases aggregate savings and growth if w˜t+12 ≥
w˜t+11 . For low levels of corruption (w˜
t+1
1 > w˜
t+1
2 ), the relationship is ambiguous.
Evolution of the wealth distribution. The fact that the individuals face
diﬀerent marginal interest rates on their wealth has important implications for
the dynamics of the wealth distribution. Since ρE ≥ ρ, the entrepreneurs ex-
perience a higher interest rate than lenders. The Euler equations then directly
imply that the entrepreneurs follow a steeper consumption path. As a result, the
wealth distribution polarizes. Since the lenders and entrepreneurs have diﬀerent
consumption growth rates, their consumption levels diverge as well.
6 Cross-Country Evidence
Our model makes no general prediction about the relationship between the
level of corruption and a measure for the inequality of the subsequent wealth
distribution, e.g. the Gini-Coeﬃcient. Corruption leads to more equality in
the low-income part of the distribution but, at the same time, increases the
diﬀerence between poor and rich. However, our model predicts that a higher
level of corruption increases the income share of the richest individuals and, in
this sense, results in a more polarized ex post wealth distribution. The aim of
this section is to verify whether such a correlation can be found in cross-country
data. In particular, we regress the change in the income share of the richest 20
% of the population on a measure for corruption (CORRUPT) and some further
independent variables.
To deal with the problem of mutual causation, the level of corruption is
measured (as an average) over the 1980-85 period whereas the change in the
income share is measured from the second half of the eighties (first observation)
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to the first half of the nineties (second observation). The gap between the two
distribution observations is on average five years.
The country-sample is, in a first step, defined by the availability of detailed
income distribution data in the late eighties and early nineties. To the best of
our knowledge, there exist two data sets providing detail distribution data based
on nationally-representative household surveys only. This are the Deininger and
Squire (1996) data set from which we take the vast majority of our observations
and the Milanovic (1999) data set. See Table 4 below for a detailed exposition on
how our sample is constructed and also for some descriptive statistics. Running
all the regression presented below based only on the Deininger and Squire data
set leads to virtually the same results (not reported).
Table 4
Using two sources for the level of corruption (that include to a large part
the same countries) allows us to collect corruption data for 53 of the 64 coun-
tries included in the inequality data set. Our basic measure is the Transparency
International (TI) historical corruption perception index. Data from the Busi-
ness International (BI) corruption perception index is only used if there is no TI
data. Data is available (average scores) for the periods 1980-85 (TI) and 1980-83
(BI). Both indices range form 0 to 10 with 10 indicating least corruption. The
rank correlation between the two indices is 0.96. Note that all results presented
below remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged if we use the BI index
in the first place and the TI index in the second place (not reported). Further
descriptive statistics is presented in Table 5. Figure 6 plots the corruption level
against the log of the per capita GDP. Table 6 provides information on the
number of countries by regions.
Table 5, Table 6, Figure 6
The further independent variables included in some of the OLS-regressions
are (i) the average growth rate of the per capita GDP between the first and
second observation (GROWTH), (ii) a measure for capital market imperfections
31
(FINANCIAL), and (iii) a dummy variable (EXP) which is assumed to be 1 if
inequality is measured based on expenditures rather than on income.
The growth of the per capita GDP may influence the income distribution
through two diﬀerent channels. First, there is a long-run eﬀect. If we exclude the
9 poorest countries from the sample of the non-socialist countries, the income
share of the richest part of the population decreases uniformly in the per capita
GDP. We may hypothesize that a good deal of the countries included in our
sample are on the decreasing part of the Kuznets-Curve.13 However, this long-
run eﬀect must be quantitatively small since the average period is only five years.
Second, there are also ”good reasons” to expect a relationship between short-
run fluctuations and the income distribution. The discussion has largely reached
a consensus that the markups (price minus marginal costs) are countercyclical
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). In addition, low-skilled workers are more
likely to lose their jobs during recession than high-skilled workers. We conclude
that both the long-run and the short-run eﬀect of growth tends to decrease the
income share of the very rich in society. The growth data is based on Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002).
The second control variable on which a huge literature exists is the level
of financial development. This literature underlines that persistent inequality
or even an increasing polarization can be explained by the theory of imperfect
credit. As a measure for the functioning of the financial system we use the
variable ”Credit to private sector (% of GDP)” provided by the World Bank
(World Development Indicators, 2000). This measure was introduced by King
and Levine (1993) and accounts for the influence of capital market imperfections
on the income distribution.14 The data is averaged over 1980-85 period. The
13In the sample consisting only of non-socialist countries, there is a strong Kuznets-type
relationship between the log of the per capita GDP and the income share of the richest part of
the population, even if we include a ”Latin Dummy”. Of course, this relationship can also be
found in the whole sample if a ”Socialist Dummy” is included. The countries to the left of the
peak of the Kuznets-Curve are: Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Senegal.
14For a detailed discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of this measure compared to
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literature on inequality and capital market imperfections and the implications
of our model in mind, we expect to find a non-positive correlation between the
functioning of the financial system and inequality.
Finally, the measurement dummy is included since, in a cross-section of indi-
viduals, measured (change in) inequality is higher using income as the measure
than using expenditure due to consumption smoothing (Deininger and Squire,
1996).
Table 7 presents our main empirical findings. We run four regressions for
both the full sample and a sample containing only non-socialist countries. In re-
gression (1), we present the basic relationship between the change in the income
share (p.a.) of the richest 20 % of the population and the level of perceived
corruption. The correlation is both quantitatively and statistically significant.
In our full sample, a one standard deviation increase in the level of corruption
(0.26) is associated with a 0.25 percentage points increase (p.a.) of the income
share of the richest 20 % of the population. This means that an increase in the
level of corruption by the diﬀerence between, for instance, the US and Morocco
leads in the subsequent five year period to an 1.25 percentage point increase in
the income share of the rich. Including the growth variable (regression 2) does
not change this correlation. The growth-coeﬃcient is negative as expected but
insignificant. If we exclude (from both the whole sample or the non-socialist
sample) those countries that are on the increasing part of the Kuznets-Curve,
the growth variable becomes marginally significant at the 5 percent level.
In regression (3), CORRUPT is dropped but the measure for the capital mar-
ket eﬃciency is included. The change in the income share of the richest part
of the population is negatively related to the level of financial development.
Interestingly, if both CORRUPT and FINANCIAL are included (regression 4),
the impact of the financial system is no longer significant whereas CORRUPT
remains qualitatively and statistically significant. We conclude that the correla-
tion between the level of financial development and the income share is mainly
driven by the correlation between the level of corruption and the level of financial
other ones see King and Levine (1993), De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), and Levine (1997).
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development.
Table 7
From our specification, one could infer that corruption leads to an ever
increasing income share of the rich. However, one must take into account that
the level of corruption will not necessarily be constant over time. In particular,
the level may adjust endogenously to changes in the income share. Consequently,
our results predict only that more corruption today may increase the inquality
tomorrow.
7 Conclusions
Persistent non-collusive corruption is observed in many of the low-income coun-
tries. Empirical evidence suggests that this kind of corruption imposes huge
costs on economic activity and redistributes wealth towards oﬃcials mainly serv-
ing in the lower-level bureaucracy. This distributional pattern seems puzzling
at least for two reasons. First, it is hard to argue that non-collusive corruption
benefits the politically powerful, e.g. government members or high-level oﬃ-
cials, to a large extent. At the same time, economically powerful groups have to
bear the direct costs. Second, recent history shows that governments are able
to reduce corruption substantially by taking a major eﬀort. So, why is there
little reformist pressure from the private sector in many of the high-corruption
countries?
We show that imperfections in the capital market may be key to understand
this phenomenon. In our model, corruption without theft redistributes wealth
also within the group of non-oﬃcials on condition that capital markets are
imperfect. In particular, we find that each member of the ”middle class” is
hurt substantially whereas a poor individual loses little in relative terms. The
rich entrepreneurs even win despite the fact that they bear a huge part of the
direct costs of corruption.
We suggest that this distributional pattern helps to explain why there are
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only weak forces in society that fight for the installation of a honest bureaucracy.
Poor people are adversely aﬀected but only moderately and through an indi-
rect channel. Put slightly diﬀerent, a reduction in corruption does not improve
the position of the poor much since they are restricted by the capital market
imperfection anyway. On the other hand, the rich understand that corruption
without theft acts as a barrier to entry. Its reduction leads to more competition
for credits on the capital market and increases the costs of capital. Only mem-
bers of the ”middle class” can gain a lot from a reduction in bribery. Lower
bribes improve their access to the capital market and allow for entrepreneurship
or make entrepreneurship more attractive for them. Given these distributional
consequences, we expect the pressure on democratic governments as well as on
authoritarian rulers to be smaller in societies characterized by a polarized wealth
distribution and a small ”middle class”. In addition, attempts in this direction
may be hindered or stopped by a coalition of wealthy individuals. Of course,
this is more likely if economical power also means political power.
Our analysis focusses on the distributional consequence of corruption if capi-
tal markets are imperfect. However, there is a more general relationship between
market imperfections, redistribution, and incentives to fight against corruption.
Suppose that the goods market is imperfect and that this goods market imper-
fection creates rents for the incumbents. If corruption acts as a barrier to entry
such that more corruption restricts (endogenously) the number of competitors
in a market, more corruption is also likely to redistribute wealth form the ex-
cluded entrepreneurs to the incumbents. Again, it may not be advantageous to
powerful incumbents to remove this barrier to entry.
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Appendix
Partial Derivatives
k(w, ρ,β) is implicitely determined by k =
³
1− λRρ
´−1
(w − βb(k)). The
partial derivatives are
∂k
∂w
=
1
1− λRρ + βb0(k)
> 0
∂k
∂ρ
= −k λR/ρ
2
1− λRρ + βb0(k)
< 0
∂k
∂β
= − b(k)
1− λRρ + βb0(k)
< 0
Derivatives
The derivatives of w˜1 and w˜2 with respect to β are given by
dw˜1
dβ
= b(1) + λR/ρ2
dρ
dβ
and
dw˜2
dβ
=
k dρdβ [1 + βb
0(k)] + ρb(k)
k (R− ρ [1 + βb0(k)]) ,
respectively. Note that the denominator of dw˜2dβ is positive since, at w = w˜2,
the return R on an additional capital unit exceeds the costs ρ [1 + βb0(k)] of
an additional unit. The (maximal) project size of an entrepreneur k(w, ρ(β),β)
depends both directly and indirectly on β. Its derivative (for a constant w) with
respect to β is
dk
dβ
= −
³
b(k) + λRρ2 k
dρ
dβ
´
1− λRρ + βb0(k)
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Tables Section 2  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Level of non-collusive corruption 
     
  lowest level highest level  
East and South Asia 0.30 0.97/Singapore 0.02/Bangladesh 2.78 
- without Singapore 0.22   2.97 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.32 0.78 /Namibia 0.05/Madagascar 2.83 
- without Namibia & Botswana 0.25   3.00 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia 0.47 0.80/Slovenia 0.28/Turkey 2.47 
Latin America 0.53 0.89/Chile 0.21/Haiti 2.74 
OECD 0.71 0.93/Sweden 0.43/France 1.63 
Sources: Measure for non-collusive corruption: own calculations based on World Bank (2002); 
Measure for corruption as an obstacle to “operation and growth of the business”: World Bank (2002). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Dependent Variable: TI 2001 CPI 
 Coef Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
Constant 0.41 (0.37) [-0.33, 1.16] 
measure for non-collusive 
corruption 5.95 (0.76) [4.43, 7.48] 
measure for collusive 
corruption 1.47 (0.73) [0.02, 2.92] 
Sources: TI 2001 CPI: Transparency International Press Release June 27, 2001; Measures for 
collusive and non-collusive corruption: own calculations based on World Bank (2002). 
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Table 3 – Rank correlations between different measures of corruption 
       
measure for non-collusive 
corruption 
1      
measure for collusive 
corruption 0.56 1     
measure for “obstacle to 
operation and growth” -0.78 -0.69 1    
TI 2001 0.82 0.58 -0.8 1   
TI 88-91 (average) 0.82 0.58 -8.84 0.87 1  
TI 80-85 (average)  0.8 0.57 -0.78 0.82 0.87 1 
Sources: TI indices: Transparency International Press Release June 27, 2001 and Transparency 
International and Göttingen University, www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/histor.htm (historical data); Measures 
for collusive and non-collusive corruption: own calculations based on World Bank (2002); Measure for 
corruption as an obstacle to “operation and growth of the business”: World Bank (2002). 
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Figures Section 6  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Correlation between corruption and the per capita GDP 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics (Income inequality) 
 Whole sample DS only Milanovic only 
- Number of observations 64 54 10 
- average time period (years) 5.05 5.02 5.2 
First observation (late eighties)    
- Mean 0.441 0.439 0.455 
- Highest 0.645 0.645 0.588 
- Lowest 0.288 0.288 0.37 
- Standard Deviation 0.078 0.081 0.066 
Second observation (early nineties)     
- Mean 0.453 0.454 0.445 
- Highest 0.652 0.652 0.579 
- Lowest 0.338 0.338 0.366 
- Standard Deviation 0.08 0.082 0.076 
Sources: Deininger and Squire (1996) and Milanovic (1999); 
Note: The year of the second observation is in general the most recent year for which detailed 
inequality data is available in the DS data set. The year of the first observation is then calculated by 
subtracting five years. If there is no DS data for this point in time, the closest year for which DS data is 
available is chosen. Only if there is no DS data for the late eighties and the early nineties, observations 
from the Milanovic data base are included. 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Descriptive statistics (Corruption indices) 
 TI first BI first TI only BI only 
- Number of observations 53 53 43 46 
- Mean 0.463 0.355 0.477 0.304 
- Highest 0.98 0.933 0.98 0.85 
- Lowest 0.159 0 0.159 0 
- Standard Deviation 0.261 0.274 0.281 0.247 
- Overlap  - - 36 
- Rank correlation - - 0.964 
Sources: Transparency International and Göttingen University, www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/histor.htm and 
Mauro (1995); 
Note: The indices are rescaled from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating least corruption. 
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Table 6 – Countries by Region 
 Number Socialist countries 
- Western Europe, North America, and Oceania 18 0 
- East and South Asia, China 12 1 
- Latin America and the Caribbean 11 0 
- Central and Eastern Europe 4 4 
- Sub-Saharan Africa 4 0 
- Middle East and Northern Africa 4 0 
Note: The socialist countries are China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union 
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Table 7  
Dependent Variable: ∆Income share of the richest 20 % 
 full sample without socialist countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CORRUPT 0.0101** (0.0037) 
0.0108** 
(0.0037)  
0.0090* 
(0.0043) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.0111** 
(0.0041)  
0.0096* 
(0.0047) 
GROWTH  -0.0464 (0.0312) 
-0.0253 
(0.0331) 
-0.040 
(0.0341)  
-0.0532 
(0.035) 
-0.0288 
(0.0357) 
-0.0504 
(0.0377) 
FINANCIAL   -0.0082* (0.0035) 
-0.0035 
(0.0042)   
-0.0082* 
(0.0036) 
-0.0034 
(0.0044) 
EXP -0.0050* (0.0021) 
-0.0056* 
(0.0021) 
-0.0053* 
(0.0021) 
-0.0058* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0046* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0056* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0051* 
(0.0022) 
-0.005* 
(0.0025) 
Observations 53 52 55 49 48 48 52 46 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1238 0.1423 0.1067 0.1202 0.0905 0.1167 0.0888 0.1024 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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